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A Two-Step Plan for Puerto Rico 
 
 
Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr. ∗  
 
Introduction 
 
 As recently as Fall 2015, some observers still believed that Puerto Rico was capable of 
meeting all of its financial obligations and continuing to provide basic services.  True, Puerto 
Rico had suffered from erratic politics and had been battered by economic setbacks such as the 
loss of a key tax deduction.  But with the right correctives, the reasoning went, Puerto Rico could 
meet all of its obligations and begin to restore its economic health. 
 
 Almost nobody believes this anymore.  Several months ago, Governor Garcia-Padilla 
started warning that Puerto Rico is not capable of paying all of its debts.  The territory has now 
defaulted on some of the debts, and could default on many more when major repayment 
obligations come due in May and July.   
 
 Is there a way forward?  We think there is.  In this short article, we outline a two-part 
plan for correcting Puerto Rico’s most urgent fiscal and financial problems.   
 
The first step is to create an independent financial control board that has authority over 
Puerto Rico’s budgets and related issues.  Notwithstanding concerns that an externally imposed 
financial control board (FCB) may interfere with the decision making processes of 
democratically elected officials – a concern we address briefly below – properly designed FCBs 
can play essential roles in the rehabilitation of distressed governments.  Such entities can provide 
expertise to officials, provide assurances to capital markets to which distressed governments 
typically require access, and overcome political obstacles to financial reform that elected 
officials might find unattractive.  For those concerned that any federal intervention constitutes a 
“bailout,” an FCB that constrains the authority of elected officials addresses the moral hazard of 
local overspending followed by requests for relief from centralized governments.   
                                                            
∗ Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law, and S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate 
Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, respectively.  
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In our view, the FCB needs to have significant Puerto Rico representation, but should be 
established and its perimeters set by Congress.  The approach of having a centralized 
government appoint members of an FCB for one of its political subdivisions has proven effective 
in addressing severe financial distress in major municipalities on the U.S. mainland.  In the 
1970s, a pair of financial control boards—one known as the Municipal Assistance Corporation 
for the City of New York and the other as the Emergency Financial Control Board—played a 
critical role in restoring the financial health of New York City during and after its near collapse.  
In the 1990s, Congress created a financial control board for Washington, DC.  As with New 
York, the control board proved highly effective.  We will draw on these and other experiences in 
crafting the features of a potential Puerto Rico FCB.1   
 
 The second step is giving Puerto Rico a mechanism for adjusting its debts.  By every 
standard measure, Puerto Rico’s debts are unsustainable.  In 2014, the Federal Reserve Board 
concluded that Puerto Rico’s debt-to-income ratio exceeds 100 percent, a figure well in excess of 
the maximum 60 percent figure that the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact requires for 
its members.2  There is no reason to believe that matters have subsequently improved. Puerto 
Rico's total public sector debt amounted to about $71 billion as of mid-2015, equivalent to about 
103 percent of its Gross National Product.3  The estimated present value of net unfunded pension 
liabilities accounts for an additional $44 billion.4 Recent tax increases and expenditure cuts have 
prevented the situation from deteriorating over the past year or so, but these measures cannot 
easily be expanded without inducing the most productive residents and firms to exit, and one-
time asset sales provide only short-term fixes to long-term problems.  Puerto Rico needs to 
restructure its debt, but it currently does not have access to any restructuring option. 
 
Unlike every American state, Puerto Rico is not permitted to authorize its municipalities 
to file for bankruptcy as Detroit, Stockton, California and other municipalities have done.  The 
First Circuit recently held that Puerto Rico cannot even enact its own, more limited restructuring 
law.5  To fix this problem, Congress could either give Puerto Rico and its municipalities access 
to existing bankruptcy vehicles, or it could craft an alternative restructuring framework for 
America’s territories.  We will advocate for the latter approach, as outlined below, although we 
believe that either approach could be used.  We also propose that both a territory and its 
municipalities be eligible for relief, not just the municipalities. 
                                                            
1 For discussion of the various forms and roles of financial control boards, Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for 
Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (2014).    
2 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, An Update on the Competitiveness of Puerto Rico’s Economy (July 31, 
2014), available at http://newyorkfed.org/outreach-andeducation/puerto-rico/2014/Puerto-Rico-Report- 
2014.pdf (last visited January 20, 2016) at 5. 
3 Hunter Clark, Andrew Haughwout, and James Orr, Some Options for Addressing Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Problems, 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/11/some-options-for-addressing-puerto-ricos-fiscal-
problems.html#more (last visited February 3, 2016).   
4 Id.  
5   See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015)(striking down Puerto Rico’s 
Recovery Act).  The Supreme Court agreed to review the First Circuit decision, and will hear oral arguments on 
March 22, 2016. 
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 The two parts of the plan we propose are closely connected.  We recommend that the 
FCB be given authority to initiate the restructuring process.  We also recommend that Puerto 
Rico or other territories and their municipalities be required to demonstrate that their 
restructuring plan will correct any obvious governance dysfunction that has substantially 
contributed to fiscal distress.  We consider the need for restructuring governmental organization 
to be sufficiently important that we recommend that it be undertaken in bankruptcy if the FCB 
has not implemented necessary reforms.   
 
Even the most effective restructuring would not be a complete solution to Puerto Rico’s 
problems.  Puerto Rico needs a plan for future economic growth, and it clearly would benefit 
from correction of harmful economic constraints such as the artificial restriction on Medicaid 
reimbursements for territories.  We do not address those issues directly in this Essay.  We focus 
instead on Puerto Rico’s urgent need for fiscal and political restructuring. 
 
 With each step of our proposal, we summarize the key features at the outset and then 
describe the key features in slightly more detail.  We also address the most important potential 
objections. 
 
 
I.  A Financial Control Board for Puerto Rico 
 
 Several states have imposed some form of FCB on localities that have suffered fiscal 
distress, and Congress created a similar board for the District of Columbia in the 1990s. While 
New York City’s experience in the 1970s is the most salient example, financial control boards 
have been used in Philadelphia; Cleveland; Chelsea, Massachusetts; Yonkers, New York; Nassau 
County, New York; and Buffalo, New York, among others.  Unlike the emergency manager 
structure that has been adopted in some states, an FCB augments, rather than displaces elected 
officials.  Ideally, the FCB can play a substantial role in returning a municipality to fiscal health 
and avoiding recidivism by monitoring and directing the financial affairs of a municipality that 
has substantially failed to provide desired public goods and services to its residents, and by 
playing an educative role for elected officials who are charged with serving the residents’ 
interests.  While an FCB necessarily intervenes in and arguably interferes with local autonomy, a 
properly designed board only minimally disrupts democratic processes and withdraws once the 
controlled entity satisfies objective benchmarks consistent with fiscal stability.  There is at least 
some evidence that an FCB can leave in its wake a culture of financial responsibility and 
structural reforms that would have been difficult for electorally accountable officials to 
accomplish in light of entrenched interests that frequently contribute to fiscal distress.   
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Basic Framework 
 
 Here, in summary form, are the key features of the financial control board we 
recommend: 
 
• Appointment of Members 
o President, after consultation with congressional committee chairs 
 
• Membership of the Board 
o Seven members overall 
o Two ex officio members: Governor of Puerto Rico; Secretary of U.S. 
Treasury 
o Two of five voting members from private sector 
o Three of five voting members from Puerto Rico 
 
• Powers of the Board 
o Authority to enter into binding debt adjustment agreements 
o Approve/disapprove annual budgets and five year plan 
o Approval authority for major contracts for goods and services 
o Approve/disapprove debt issuances 
o Receive and disburse revenues 
o Impose best practices and sanction failure to follow 
 
• Termination and Reinstatement of Board 
o Board would terminate once fiscal benchmarks were established 
o Board would reassert active role if deficits or other specified signs of crisis 
returned 
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Discussion 
 
Appointment of the Board 
 
 We recommend following the procedure for appointment that Congress adopted with 
respect to the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance 
Authority.  That procedure involved presidential appointment after consultation with the chairs 
of various congressional committee chairs and the Delegate to the House of Representatives 
from the District of Columbia.  We similarly recommend that the President make appointments 
to the Puerto Rico FCB after consultation with the Chair of the House Committee on Natural 
Resources, which has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, and the Resident Commissioner for Puerto 
Rico in the House of Representatives.  We recognize that the current political climate may be 
less conducive to enactment of a law that gives Congress a lesser role in naming members of the 
FCB.  Our recommendation is based on our view that the absence of direct representation of 
Puerto Rico in Congress gives the legislature less of a claim on the right of appointment.  
Nevertheless, we do not have a strong theoretical objection to an alternative process in which 
each of the President, the Speaker of the House, and the Majority Leader of the Senate appoints 
some proportion of the FCB’s membership.   
 
Membership 
 
We recommend a board of 7 members, large enough to ensure representation of multiple 
constituencies and expertise, but not so large as to be unwieldy.  Two of these should be ex 
officio members.  One should be the Governor of Puerto Rico.  Inclusion of the Governor 
provides legitimacy to the FCB and may diminish concerns that its creation constitutes a federal 
takeover of the Commonwealth.  Inclusion of the Governor also allows him or her to benefit 
from the expertise of other members.  In the New York City situation in the 1970s, for example, 
the mayor served as a member of the Emergency Financial Control Board for the City of New 
York.   
 
The other ex officio member should be the Treasury Secretary or his/her designate.  This 
would ensure representation of federal interests in the fiscal health of a territory of the United 
States.  FCBs imposed by the state typically include state officers or appointees of the Governor 
in order to ensure that the state’s interests are represented.  
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Of the five non-ex officio members, at least three should be from Puerto Rico.  With the 
Governor as an ex officio member, this would give the Puerto Rico members a majority of the 
seats on the FCB.  Members of the FCB for the District of Columbia appointed under the District 
of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995 were required to 
have a primary residence in the District of Columbia or a primary place of business in the 
District of Columbia.  We believe that is an unnecessary constraint that would deprive Puerto 
Rico of talent that could be of great assistance in resolving issues facing Puerto Rico.  We note 
that the emergency manager for the City of Detroit resided in Washington, D.C. at the time of his 
appointment and that Puerto Rico itself relied on experts outside of Puerto Rico to evaluate and 
make recommendations with respect to its financial condition when it commissioned what has 
become known as the Krueger Report.6  Most importantly, what Puerto Rico needs at this point 
in time is creative, innovative thinking about government structure and finance.  While we do not 
doubt that qualified individuals reside in Puerto Rico, there is little reason to deny the 
Commonwealth the benefit of expertise about public finance and institutional design that has 
developed elsewhere.  At the same time, we believe that a membership that is largely local 
enhances the likelihood that necessary reforms and austerity programs will be accepted by 
Commonwealth residents and officials.   
 
We recommend that at least two of the five non ex-officio members come from the 
private sector.  We would expect that these individuals would have substantial experience in 
budgeting, public debt, and capital markets.  One of the functions of a board is to facilitate access 
to the capital markets; including members who have had experience dealing with those markets 
can both provide comfort to potential investors in Puerto Rico and serve as effective emissaries 
to sources of financial assistance.  It was arguably on this theory that the original members of the 
Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York included a senior partner at an 
investment banking firm; a former federal judge and law firm partner; the former Secretary of 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development; a political science professor; the head of 
New York Telephone; a stock broker; an investment banker; and the head of a New York City 
based business.  In considering the qualifications of specific members, it is important to keep in 
mind the nature of the crisis that Puerto Rico is addressing.  The crisis in the District of 
Columbia was primarily a budgetary one, characterized by a series of annual deficits.  That 
situation is exacerbated in Puerto Rico by a debt crisis, characterized by substantial numbers and 
variation in creditors and obligors.  Individuals from the private sector may have superior 
experience with credit markets, restructuring, and efficient service delivery that would underlie 
recommendations that address the Commonwealth’s current situation. 
 
   
 
 
                                                            
6   See Anne O. Krueger, Ranjit Teja, and Andrew Wolfe, Puerto Rico – A Way Forward, available at 
http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/puertoricoawayforward.pdf.    
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Powers of Financial Control Board 
 
o Negotiate with creditors and enter into binding debt adjustment agreements 
 
Some creditors have indicated an unwillingness to trust the financial figures generated by 
Puerto Rico concerning the degree of fiscal distress. A financial control board that was perceived 
as being independent of electoral politics and that is charged with obtaining or confirming 
accurate and reliable financial information may bring a degree of transparency and credibility to 
portrayals of Puerto Rico’s current financial situation.  These would facilitate negotiations with 
creditors and allow adjustments of debts in light of credible figures.  We are not suggesting that 
the figures provided to date by Puerto Rico are inaccurate. We suggest only that negotiations 
require credibility about the financial position of the Commonwealth that can fostered by an 
independent board.   
 
o Commission and review audits of financial statements  
 
The control board should be given authority (and funding) to commission and review 
audits of Puerto Rico or any of its municipalities and affiliated entities. 
 
o Approve/disapprove annual budgets and five-year financial plan 
 
  We recommend that the Financial Control Board be given authority to approve or 
disapprove Puerto Rico’s annual budgets.  We also recommend that the FCB require the 
preparation of a five-year financial plan, and that it be given authority to approve or disapprove 
the plan.   Such plans increase transparency by providing benchmarks against which actual 
spending can be measured and making subsequent deviations from projected expenditures more 
salient.  The FCB would be required to convene revenue estimating conferences with 
Commonwealth officials and to review and approve monthly or quarterly reports of revenues and 
expenditures.   
 
We do not, however, recommend that the FCB be permitted to determine spending 
priorities within a balanced budget.  This would preserve autonomy in financial decisions for 
elected officials as long as the overall budget complied with requirements.  The New York 
Emergency Financial Control Board (“EFCB”), which augmented MAC’s oversight of New 
York City, exercised substantial powers over that city’s budget.  During a control period, the 
EFCB had authority to approve, disapprove, or modify the city’s financial plan; obtain and 
disburse revenues that otherwise would have flowed directly to the city; review contracts for 
compliance with the financial plan; and approve or disapprove borrowings.  The city alone, 
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however, retained the capacity to determine the purposes for which expenditures were to be 
made and the amounts of such expenditures, as long as the aggregate expenditures remained 
within the financial plan. 
 
o Exercise approval authority for contracts for goods or services  
 
Board approval should be required for all substantial contracts.  This would include 
collective bargaining agreements with public service unions.  Municipalities that have 
experienced fiscal distress have frequently been criticized as providing generous compensation 
to organized employees, as officials attempt to solidify political support.7  An appointed FCB has 
the benefit of being able to evaluate the propriety of proposed collective bargaining agreements 
independent of the political pressures that elected officials face.   
 
 
o Approve/disapprove debt issues 
 
The board should have authority to approve or disapprove any new debt issues. 
 
o Receive and disburse all Puerto Rico revenues 
 
While we do not recommend that the FCB replace elected officials, as was done in 
Detroit, we do recommend that revenues (taxes, bond proceeds, and federal funds) that would 
otherwise flow to the Commonwealth should instead be received and disbursed by the FCB 
during a control period.  This procedure, again followed in New York City, allows the FCB to 
withhold funds in the event that there is substantial deviation from agreed-on expenditures or 
cost reductions.  With the FCB for the District of Columbia, each time the mayor requisitioned 
funds from U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Treasury deposited the funds in an escrow account controlled 
by the FCB.  The FCB then released the funds when and as it deemed appropriate, consistent 
with the financial plan and budget for the year.  With Puerto Rico, a similar procedure of 
disbursements through the FCB would assure the credit markets that the Commonwealth has 
incentives to act in a fiscally responsible manner, and create the strongest inducement for 
creation of and compliance with a financial plan.   
 
We understand that requiring that disbursements of revenues occur through the FCB 
might be politically infeasible, even if fiscally prudent.  Even if the FCB does not capture 
revenues otherwise payable to the Commonwealth, it should retain the lesser, but still effective 
                                                            
7 See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, California, 542 B.R. 261 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 2015). 
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capacity to approve disbursements of Commonwealth revenues.  Withholding funds from the 
municipality essentially becomes a “nuclear” option.  If withholding funds is the only sanction 
available to the FCB, it may not be used because its deployment will cause the Commonwealth 
to default on obligations.  It may be useful, therefore, to combine the option with less harsh 
alternatives, such as heightened review or the ability of the FCB to take direct control of 
municipal functions prior to or in place of withholding funds. 
 
o Impose best practices and sanction failure to follow 
 
The control board should have authority to impose on the Commonwealth a series of 
“best practices” for budgeting and accounting, both to educate municipal officials and to 
facilitate monitoring of fiscal performance.   
 
This authority is has been a common feature of financial control boards in other contexts.  
The Ohio statute concerning financial control of distressed municipalities requires a city in a 
control period to adopt specified financial accounting and reporting systems.  Both MAC and the 
EFCB had the authority to advise New York City on its management practices and budgetary 
practices.  The EFCB required implementation of a financial management system that integrated 
information across financial functions and across agencies; reconciled differences in accounting 
methods used by different offices; and, by incorporating generally accepted accounting 
principles, improved monitoring of city finances. 
 
 The control board should be able to impose sanctions, including removal, against officials 
who violate its orders or policies. 
 
Termination and reinstatement of board 
 
 The control board would withdraw from an active role in the management of the 
Commonwealth when specified fiscal benchmarks were satisfied.  
 
But the control board should reassert an active role whenever the Commonwealth 
suffered one of the following events: (1) failure to adopt a balanced budget; (2) failure to pay 
principal of or interest on any bonds or notes when due; (3) existence of a non-minimal operating 
deficit in any major fund of the Commonwealth; (4) failure of the chief fiscal officer of the 
Commonwealth to certify that securities are saleable in amounts that will satisfy substantially all 
of the capital and cash flow requirements of the Commonwealth during a specified period in 
accordance with the financial plan discussed below.   
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Democratic concerns 
 
We discuss below the need to allow governmental reorganization, either through the FCB 
or through the bankruptcy process.  Although financial control boards are sometimes criticized as 
undermining democracy, if successfully implemented they can have the opposite effect, 
restructuring democratic processes that have failed to provide services desired by constituents at 
a tax price that induces residents and firms to remain in Puerto Rico.  It is difficult to maintain 
that Puerto Rico, which has suffered an exodus of residents, a debt structure that is not 
sustainable, and a dwindling economy, has been acting in a manner consistent with the interests 
of residents, as would occur in a well-functioning democracy.  If federal funds or guarantees are 
made available to Puerto Rico, democratic principles also suggest that federal involvement is 
appropriate to ensure that the Commonwealth’s economy recovers sufficiently to permit 
repayment and that federal funds are spent in a manner consistent with expectations.   
Some have claimed that a strong federally appointed FCB would amount to an 
assumption by the United States of sovereign authority over Puerto Rico, and would expose the 
United States Treasury to liability for Puerto Rico indebtedness.  We conclude that these 
statements, certainly insofar as they relate to existing debt of Puerto Rico, are not correct.  Puerto 
Rico debt, by its own terms, is limited to payment from stated sources, typically tax revenues or 
revenues generated by the operation of facilities operated by Puerto Rico instrumentalities.  The 
U.S. has not guaranteed these debts or pledged revenues for their repayment..  The claim that 
creation of a federal FCB would make the United States a successor in interest and thus 
responsible for the debt of the Puerto Rico rests on scenarios far removed from anything that we 
contemplate herein.  Case law recognizes that liability for pre-existing debts may attach to a new 
entity where a state dissolves an existing debtor municipality and replaces it with a proposed new 
one that contains essentially the same boundaries, tax base, or population as the dissolved entity.  
In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the “new” municipality was responsible 
for the debts of the “old” municipality.8  But that is a far cry from the framework we advocate in 
which the debtor municipality is not dissolved at all, but is augmented by a temporary control 
board that exercises substantial discretion over a limited number of fiscal powers of a distressed 
locality.    
 
 
II. A Restructuring Law for the Territories 
 
 Although an effective financial control board could bring crucial discipline to Puerto 
Rico’s budgets and reassure credit markets, we do not believe that discipline alone is sufficient to 
alleviate Puerto Rico’s financial distress.  By every realistic yardstick, Puerto Rico’s debtload is 
unsustainable.  Because Puerto Rico does not currently have access to a formal restructuring 
mechanism, we recommend that Congress create such a structure. 
                                                            
8 See, e.g., Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880). 
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 Either of two approaches would work.  Congress could give Puerto Rico access to the 
existing municipal bankruptcy laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Alternatively, 
Congress could create a new restructuring framework for Puerto Rico and the other territories, 
borrowing some features of Chapter 9 but including other provisions tailored more directly to the 
territorial context.  As discussed more fully below, we recommend the latter approach, a new 
territorial restructuring law.  If Congress were to extend Chapter 9 instead, we would recommend 
amending Chapter 9 to address the specific issues discussed below. 
 
 
 
Basic Framework 
 
 Here, in summary form, are the key features of the restructuring law we recommend: 
 
• Enact a territorial restructuring law  
o Authority: U.S. Const., Article IV Territorial Clause, and U.S. Const., Article 
I Bankruptcy Clause 
o Separate from current municipal bankruptcy law (Chapter 9) 
 
• Scope: Both the territory and its municipalities may file 
 
• Treatment of separate entities 
o Separate entities may file if the territory itself files 
o Insolvency not required for separate entities 
o Cases consolidated administratively, not substantively 
 Entities must be treated separately; but 
 Single reorganization plan permitted 
 
• Initiation 
o Either Governor or Financial Control Board can invoke the restructuring law 
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• Key provisions 
o Automatic stay on litigation 
o Majority vote binds each class of creditors 
o Right to assume or reject contracts 
o Financing may be provided by public or private entities 
o Creditors protected by definitions of “unfair discrimination” and “best 
interests” 
o “Feasibility” includes governance reform 
 
 
Discussion 
 
A territorial restructuring law 
 
 Under current law, Puerto Rico has no formal mechanism for restructuring its debts.  In 
1984, Congress excluded Puerto Rico’s municipalities from Chapter 9, the municipal bankruptcy 
laws.9  Ordinarily, a state or territory could craft its own, more limited restructuring law even in 
the absence of access to federal bankruptcy law.  Puerto Rico pursued this option in 2014, 
enacting a law known as the Recovery Act.  Federal trial and appellate courts have struck down 
this law, however, concluding that it was preempted by a provision in Chapter 9 that restricts the 
right of a state to enact its own restructuring laws.10   Although the Supreme Court has agreed to 
review the case, the case is not likely to be decided until summer 2016.   
 
 The most obvious solution to this predicament, in which every state has access to a 
restructuring option for its municipalities but Puerto Rico does not, would be to reverse Puerto 
Rico’s exclusion from Chapter 9.  Legislation that would have this effect is pending in Congress.  
Access to Chapter 9 is clearly preferable to the current no-man’s land in which Puerto Rico finds 
itself; we ourselves have advocated precisely this step elsewhere. 
 
 For several reasons, however, we believe that Congress should enact a separate 
restructuring law for Puerto Rico and the other territories, either as a standalone restructuring law 
                                                            
9   Congress adopted a definition of “State” that treats Puerto Rico as a state for other purposes under the bankruptcy 
laws, but not for the purposes of a filing for Chapter 9.  Because only a state can authorize municipalities to file for 
Chapter 9 under 11 U.S.C. § 109(c), Puerto Rico and its municipalities are excluded. 
10   See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015)(striking down Puerto Rico’s 
Recovery Act). 
13 
 
or as a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.11  First, the territories have features that distinguish 
them from the states.  Territories are more independent than states in some respects (e.g., they 
function somewhat like countries) and less independent in others (e.g., Congress has direct 
control over them).  Second, several of Chapter 9’s key requirements are an awkward fit for 
Puerto Rico.  Chapter 9 applies only to “municipalities,” a term that does not apply to Puerto 
Rico itself and may not apply to some of the other entities that have issued debt.  In addition, 
some of the relevant entities might not meet Chapter 9’s insolvency requirement.  Third, crafting 
a unique restructuring law for territories will underscore that Congress’s treatment of Puerto 
Rico has no bearing on the absence of a bankruptcy law for the states; they are separate issues. 
 
 Congress’s authority to enact a restructuring law would come from the Territories Clause 
in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress broad authority over the territories; 
together with the Bankruptcy Clause in Article I of the Constitution.  Including all territories, 
rather than just Puerto Rico, would assuage any concerns that the law is not “uniform,” as 
required by the Bankruptcy Clause. 
 
Scope: either the territory or its municipalities may file 
 
 A key initial question is whether to give Puerto Rico (or another territory) itself access to 
the restructuring law, or solely Puerto Rico’s municipalities.  Of Puerto Rico’s roughly $70  
billion of debt, nearly $50 billion is owed directly or indirectly by Puerto Rico itself.  Unless 
these obligations are restructured, Puerto Rico is unlikely to achieve enough debt reduction to 
adequately address its crisis.  We therefore recommend that both the territory itself and its 
municipalities and other entities be permitted to restructure. 
 
 
Treatment of separate entities 
 
 In Puerto Rico, at least eighteen different entities have issued debt.  These include the 
Government Development Bank, which serves as Puerto Rico’s fiscal agent; Prepa, the public 
electricity company; and Cofina, which has issued bonds secured by sales taxes.  Some of these 
entities are not traditional municipalities—they are primarily conduits for the issuance of debt—
and some may not technically be insolvent.   
 
                                                            
11   As noted earlier, if Congress does extend Chapter 9 to Puerto Rico instead, it will need to address most of the 
issues we discuss in the text that follows.  Chapter 9 already includes the “key provisions” we discuss, but it does 
not address the other issues flagged in this part of the Article. 
14 
 
 We recommend that the restructuring law provide that, if the FCB initiates the 
restructuring law (and meets its entrance requirements) for the Commonwealth, it should also be 
permitted to initiate proceedings for any of its municipalities or affiliated entities as well.  The 
affiliated entities should not be subject to an insolvency requirement.  Requiring every entity to 
demonstrate insolvency could create costly and time-consuming disputes as to whether each 
individual entity is insolvent, even if the territory itself and most of its entities are clearly 
insolvent.   
 
 If multiple entities invoke the restructuring law, we recommend that the cases be 
administered jointly, but that the entity boundaries be respected.  Creditors of a particular entity 
should have first claim to the assets of that entity unless they consent to different treatment.  This 
is roughly the approach used in the Chapter 11 reorganizations of complex private 
corporations.12 
 
Initiation 
 
 We recommend that the governor (or principal executive) of the territory and the FCB 
each be given independent authority to invoke the restructuring framework.  Since the governor 
is an ex officio member of the control board, the governor will have major input into any 
decision by the FCB to initiate a restructuring. 
 
Key provisions 
 
o Automatic stay on litigation 
 
In an ordinary bankruptcy, the “automatic stay” prohibits creditors from suing the debtor 
or taking any other steps to collect what they are owed.13  The objective is to prevent a “race to 
the courthouse” that could jeopardize the debtor’s restructuring effort.  The stay is not quite as 
essential for a territory or country, since it is more difficult for creditors to successfully sue a 
public entity.  Lawsuits can nevertheless pose serious problems for a territory such as Puerto 
Rico.  Puerto Rico already faces a growing number of lawsuits that will be costly to defend. 
 
                                                            
12   In technical terms, courts ordinarily do not allow “substantive consolidation”—the merging of the assets and 
liabilities of different entities—unless the creditors that would be affected agree to the consolidation.  See In re 
Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005). 
13   11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
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Given these realities, we believe that the restructuring law should include a stay on 
litigation or other efforts to collect debts or realize on collateral pledged for debts.  The stay 
should begin as soon as the statutory restructuring process is initiated.  
 
o Majority vote binds each class of creditors 
 
Puerto Rico theoretically could restructure its bond debt through an exchange offer or 
other private arrangement outside of any formal restructuring law.  Indeed, Puerto Rico entities 
been trying to do this with some of their debt—most notably, the debt of Prepa.  The difficulty is 
that, even if a significant majority of bondholders favor a restructuring, the restructuring is not 
binding on bondholders who do not consent.  This gives bondholders an incentive to hold out, 
since they are likely to be paid in full if most other bondholders agree to a restructuring.  
 
To counteract this problem, the restructuring law should include a voting provision that 
binds all of the creditors in a class if a specified majority of the class agrees to the restructuring.  
Voting rules are standard in bankruptcy; this was the central feature of the earliest municipal 
bankruptcy laws in the 1930s.  We recommend that a class of creditors be bound if two-thirds in 
amount of the allowed claims of the class that votes on the plan vote to accept the plan.  This is 
similar to the voting rule that applies in corporate and municipal bankruptcy cases.14 
 
o Right to assume or reject contracts 
 
Outside of bankruptcy, it is often very difficult to terminate some kinds of contracts that are 
problematic for the debtor or undesirable for other reasons; and the debtor may lose its rights 
under a contract that is desirable if the debtor defaults.  Bankruptcy’s treatment of so-called 
executory contracts is designed to counteract these problems.  It permits a debtor to terminate 
undesirable contracts and assume desirable contracts.  We recommend that the restructuring law 
include these powers.   
 
o Financing may be provided by public or private entities 
 
Current bankruptcy law gives the bankruptcy court broad authority to authorize new 
financing for a bankruptcy debtor.  The financing provision does not distinguish between private 
and government financers.  
 
                                                            
14   11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).  The main difference is that § 1126(c) also includes a majority-in-number requirement.  
This requirement would not be likely to have a significant effect in a territorial bankruptcy. 
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We recommend that the restructuring law include similar financing authority.  We do not 
recommend that the law provide a designated source of public funding, as the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 does for systemically important financial institutions.  Although the liquidity needs of a 
territory or its affiliated entities may be pressing in the event of financial distress, a territory is 
less fragile than a financial institution.  We believe that the ordinary bankruptcy options for 
arranging financing are likely to be sufficient for a territory (as they are for municipalities under 
Chapter 9).    
 
o Creditors protected by definitions of “unfair discrimination” and “best 
interests of the creditors” 
 
Key issues for creditors include their concerns that their treatment be as predictable as 
possible, that classes of general creditors be given roughly comparable treatment, and that 
creditors’ payout not be reduced more than is necessary.  Chapter 9 attempts to address these 
concerns with a variety of provisions.  Two of the most important are the requirements that a 
proposed plan not “discriminate unfairly” against any class of creditors, and that the plan be in 
the “best interests of creditors.”  Both requirements are subject to uncertainty in cases involving 
public entities. 
 
With the “no unfair discrimination requirement,” one of us believes that the requirement 
should be defined to prohibit approval of a restructuring plan in which recoveries among classes 
of unsecured creditors deviate more than 20%.  The other believes that the specific 
characteristics of different debts and different creditors make limits on variations inadvisable.  
We both recommend that the restructuring law include a “no unfair discrimination” requirement. 
 
 Under current Chapter 9, “best interests” of the creditors has sometimes been defined to 
suggest that nearly any proposal is acceptable, since creditors’ prospects for recovery outside of 
bankruptcy would be dim.  The definition of “best interests” outside of Chapter 9 is frequently 
tied to what creditors would have received in a liquidation.  Since governmental entities are not 
liquidated in Chapter 9, that definition requires modification.  We recommend that “best 
interests” be included in the restructuring law, but defined to require that the proposed plan give 
creditors as much as “reasonably possible,” consistent with the public entity’s obligation to 
provide services to its constituents.  Public entities are created to provide public goods that may 
not otherwise be available.  As a result, we consider the maintenance of at least a baseline level 
of service delivery to be the primary objective of restructuring.  This is consistent with the 
perspective of courts and commentators that have analyzed the “best interests” test in Chapter 9 
proceedings.15    
 
                                                            
15 See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, California, 542 B.R. 261 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 2015); 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 
943.03[7][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
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o Governance Reform 
 
Under current Chapter 9, a court can only approve a proposed restructuring plan if it is 
“feasible”—which is generally interpreted to mean likely to succeed.  Most courts focus 
primarily on the extent to which the plan will restructure the debtor’s financial obligations, and 
do not consider whether governance dysfunction may have been an underlying cause of the 
distress.  We have argued in our scholarly work that courts should decline to approve a 
restructuring plan as feasible if the plan does not address obvious governance dysfunction.16  We 
are led to that conclusion by a view that government structure is frequently a primary cause of 
fiscal distress.  Fragmented governmental decision making often increases the size of 
government as multiple actors make budgetary claims, entrenched interest groups resist reforms 
that reduce their share of government budgets, and lack of competition for services allows 
providers to ignore efficiencies.   
 
Puerto Rico appears to exhibit many of these characteristics.  Taxes and fees are not 
collected.  A plethora of government agencies (approximately 120) provide services with 
insufficient centralization to avoid overlap and coordination among public services.  Public 
sector employment has historically constituted a more substantial portion of the workforce as a 
share of population than is typical on the mainland.  That proportion has been reduced, but the 
paucity of private sector employment is likely to constrain the ability to impose additional cuts in 
the public sector.  Because these structures can contribute to inefficiencies in the delivery of 
public goods and services, and entrenched interests frustrate efforts at reform, we believe it is 
necessary that some external body be authorized to eliminate or consolidate government 
agencies, and to implement structural economic, labor or tax measures that promise to deliver 
goods and services at prices that will attract the residents and businesses necessary to economic 
development in the Commonwealth. 
 
While we believe that current Chapter 9, properly understood, permits governance reform 
to be included in the debtor’s plan of adjustment, we are sensitive to questions of statutory 
construction and constitutional limitations on the ability of federal bankruptcy judges to induce 
structural reform of municipalities.  Territories, however, stand in a very different relationship to 
Congress than States, and thus present fewer constitutional difficulties.  We recommend that any 
bankruptcy statute for Puerto Rico or its municipalities explicitly permit governmental 
restructuring as part of a “feasible” plan for a governmental debtor.  Indeed, Congress explicitly 
became involved with governance restructuring in the District of Columbia when it required the 
appointment of a chief financial officer for the District and conferred on that office many of the 
budgetary powers previously residing in the mayor. 
 
                                                            
16   Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 
Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2016). 
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In the case of Puerto Rico, such restructuring might include the creation of a nonpartisan 
budget office along the lines of the New York City Independent Budget Office that was created 
after that city’s brush with bankruptcy in the 1970s.  It may also involve centralized authority 
over budgets and functions to avoid duplication of resources.  At the very least, restructuring 
would entail modernization of budget and management to align with principles adopted for 
government accounting in municipalities on the mainland.    
 
As we have noted above, an FCB could also be charged with governance reform. We are 
somewhat agnostic as to whether structural reforms occur as a function of FCB intervention or 
bankruptcy court intervention. We would authorize each to take the necessary steps as we are 
more concerned with the substance and implementation of structural change than with its source.  
 
In our view, it is not necessary to explicitly define the “feasibility” requirement to require 
governance reform; but lawmakers may wish to include such a requirement. 
 
A risk of contagion? 
 The most important concern with giving Puerto Rico access to a restructuring option is 
that introducing the possibility of restructuring could have damaging effects on the municipal 
bond market as a whole.  Critics worry that confidence in the municipal bond market might 
decline, and that this could lead to higher interest rates and possibly a decline in market access 
throughout the country. 
 In our view, adopting a restructuring regime would not create a meaningful risk of 
contagion.  First, although municipal defaults sometimes have effects beyond the municipality 
itself, these effects are usually short-term in nature and confined to the other municipalities 
within the same state as a municipality that has defaulted.17   Municipal markets may not be as 
robust as those for securities of private companies; nevertheless, the increased requirements of 
disclosure and reporting with respect to municipal securities suggests that markets would be able 
to distinguish between distressed and nondistressed entities.  Second, if the existence of a 
restructuring option had adverse effects on credit markets, we would expect to find bond insurers 
charging higher rates or credit rating agencies issuing lower ratings for bonds issued by 
municipalities in states that permit bankruptcy.  But this does not appear to be the case.  
Moreover, the existing evidence suggests that interest rates may actually be lower, not higher, in 
states that permit bankruptcy when other factors are controlled for.18  Finally, it is important to 
recognize that Puerto Rico is already unable to pay its debts.  The choice is not between a 
restructuring option, on the one hand, and full payment, on the other.  The choice is between an 
                                                            
17 See, e.g., Mardi Dungey, et al, Contagion in International Bond Markets During the Russian and the LTCM 
Crises, 2 J Fin Stability 1, 19 (2006); John M. Halstead, Shantaram Hegde, and Linda Schmid Klein, Orange County 
Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 Fin. Rev. 293, 295–99, 313 
(2004). 
18   See, e.g, Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, The Paralysis Justification and a Unifying Approach to Municipal 
Restructuring (Jan 26, 2016), available at www.ssrn.com. 
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orderly restructuring framework and a disorderly default.  From this perspective, a restructuring 
option seems likely to be better for the municipal bond market as a whole, not worse. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Puerto Rico’s financial crisis is so deep that no approach is guaranteed to provide relief.  
But we belief that the two-step strategy we have outlined provides a realistic path forward.  The 
proposed control board and restructuring law draw extensively on the experience of other major 
financial crises, ranging from New York City to Detroit.  The strategies incorporated into our 
two-step proposal have helped to alleviate severe crises in these other contexts.  We believe they 
offer hope for Puerto Rico. 
 
 
  
 
 
